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Peers and Fertility Preferences: An Empirical Investigation of the Role of 
Neighbours, Religion and Education  
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Individual fertility preference is influenced by observed social norms. The present paper 
investigates the effect of the observed fertility of peers on a woman’s fertility preference. We 
explore the role of two peer groups: neighbourhood peers and religious peers. Data from the 
National Family Health Surveys (1992-93, 1998-99 and 2005-06) in India is employed for 
empirical estimations using a multinomial logit model. We find that both neighbourhood and 
religious peers have a significant impact on individual fertility preferences, but their relative 
importance changes with family size. An increase in peer fertility increases the probability of 
preferring more children. We further examine the roles of education and wealth as 
transmission channels between the fertility norms of peers to the fertility preferences of the 
women and find that education plays an important role in moderating peer influences. These 
findings can serve as vital inputs in formulating family planning and gender policies.  
 
Keywords: peer effects, multinomial logit, fertility, India, education, wealth status 
 
JEL codes: D12, J13 
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Peers and Fertility Preferences: An Empirical Investigation of the Role of 
Neighbours, Religion and Education  
 
1. Introduction 
In a simple economic framework, fertility is analysed as an individual or a household 
decision. However, it has long been recognised that individual fertility is not only influenced 
by individual preferences and constraints, but is also shaped by wider societal influences. In 
this paper, we contribute to the understanding of the influence of these societal norms on 
fertility preferences by exploring the impact of peer fertility. We find that the observed 
fertility of neighbourhood peers has a strong influence on fertility preferences. Fertility 
preferences are also shaped by the fertility norms prevailing in associated religious groups.  
 
We extend the existing literature in several important directions. First, we study the peer 
effects on fertility preferences. The empirical literature on peer effects on fertility so far has 
studied fertility in terms of contraceptive use or children (number of children, or birth of a 
child in a defined time period). We model fertility in terms of the ideal number of children a 
woman would like to have, thus concentrating on fertility preferences. This complements 
existing studies by shedding more light on the mechanism of peer effects, a change in 
preferences versus a change in behaviour. Secondly, as McNicoll (2009) argues, fertility 
transitions are driven by legacy (including cultural and institutional inheritance), 
circumstances (the larger political and economic environment) and policy. We analyse the 
role of community and cultural legacy in the form of religious and geographical community. 
We identify two groups from whom an individual references her fertility preferences: 
neighbourhood peers and religious peers. By investigating the relative importance of these 
two peer groups, we can shed light on the role of social groups in fertility. The third 
contribution of this study is particularly relevant for policy. We show that education is a 
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particularly important channel for moderating peer effects; hence, education can be an 
effective policy tool, particularly for countries in a high fertility trap. Our finding of the 
moderating role played by education on peer effects is in line with McNichol’s (2009) 
suggestion that the main scope for policy effects on fertility transitions is through reshaping 
the societal features governing fertility behaviour. While the important role of education in 
fertility transition is well established, we contribute to the policy discussion by empirically 
demonstrating one mechanism of this effect.  
 
Literature review 
The effects of social groups on individual behaviour are well recognised in the context of 
education (see Sacerdote, 2011, for a recent review of this literature). Studies now provide 
empirical evidence for such effects in other contexts as well, such as on consumption 
decisions (Moretti, 2011), migration (Chen et al., 2010), charitable giving (Smith et al., 2015) 
and criminal (Gaviria and Raphael, 2001) and risk taking behaviours (Lahno and Serra-
Garcia, 2014). In a broad sense, peers’ background, current behaviour and outcomes generate 
an externality, affecting other individuals. 
 
Fertility decisions are social decisions. In contrast to purely economic decisions which are 
primarily driven by direct changes in utility due to choices, social decisions are made in the 
context of the social network, and the interaction with its members may be the primary 
determinant of these choices (Akerlof, 1997). The fertility literature recognises the role of 
social interactions, through social learning and social influences, on individual fertility 
(Kohler et al., 2001). Social influences are normative influences on behaviour, with 
individuals influenced by the opinions and behaviour in their social environment. In 
conceptualising and estimating peer effects, we employ the proposition by Akerlof (1997) 
5 
 
that an individual acts in a conformist manner in her fertility decisions; hence, she attempts to 
minimize the social distance between herself and others. Thus, in the present context, in 
addition to reacting to their private economic trade-offs, prospective parents respond to social 
norms about “appropriate” family size by minimising their fertility distance from others as 
best they can. Zafar (2012) suggests that individuals conform to their reference group through: 
(i) social learning through the experience of others; (ii) utility gain from making the same 
choice as the group; or (iii) sticking to the norm through image-related concerns.  
 
Individuals form their fertility preferences by observing social norms. These norms are 
derived from groups that are close in terms of social distance. These social groups can be 
inherited (such as family and religion) as well as acquired (through workplace or 
neighbourhood).  Axinn et al. (1994) document the important role of the immediate family in 
the form of a mother’s preference. Cross-sibling influences (Kuziemko, 2006; Lyngstad and 
Prskawetz, 2010) provide further evidence of such transmission. Such social interactions are 
also found within a workplace (Ciliberto et al., 2013) and community (Kravdal, 2002; Kohler 
et al., 2001). The social peers on whom individuals rely to form their fertility preferences 
may extend to religious groups within the community, as documented by Munshi and Myaux 
(2006) in the case of Bangladesh.  
 
These studies provide important empirical evidence for peer effects on fertility.  The findings 
of these studies show that factors influencing individual fertility behaviour extend beyond the 
individual. The results from these studies are consistent in finding that social groups do have 
an effect on individual fertility. However, the existing literature concentrates on one 
particular group for analysis. We contribute to this literature by assessing the relative 
importance of two groups. Further, studies so far model fertility in terms of contraception use 
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or number of children, thus concentrating on the fertility behaviour. The present paper 
extends this analysis by investigating the effect of peers on fertility preference. The choice 
between behaviour and preference in fertility analysis is further discussed below. This paper 
also explores the interaction between peer effects and other control variables in order to better 
understand the channels of effects on fertility. 
 
Understanding the magnitude and role of these channels has obvious policy implications. 
Moreover, they can also have important implications for fertility theory, as illustrated by 
Bhattacharya and Chakraborty (2012) who show the importance of social norms in the 
relationship between fertility and child mortality. We further explore the role education plays 
in moderating social influences on fertility. Studies have consistently documented that 
fertility declines with an increase in education levels (e.g. Kalsen and Launov, 2006; Zanin et 
al., 2014). In the context of India, Drèze and Murthi (2001) provide robust evidence for the 
role of women’s education in fertility decline, by influencing: (i) desired family size; (ii) the 
relationship between desired family size and planned number of births; and (iii) women’s 
ability to achieve the planned number of births. Our results support Drèze and Murthi’s (2001) 
hypothesis that female education can be expected to reduce desired family size through 
enhanced receptiveness to modern social norms by moderating the influence of the traditional 
channels of religion and neighbours. Cochrane et al. (1990) and Sathar et al. (2003) have 
documented the effect of education on desired family size in the context of Egypt and 
Pakistan, respectively. However, the present study is the first to document that education 
affects fertility preferences by moderating peer effects.  
  
Fertility can be modelled either as fertility behaviour or as fertility preference. While fertility 
behaviour does not exactly and perfectly match preference, preferences and intentions for 
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future childbearing are found to predict fertility behaviour (Hayford and Agadjanian, 2012). 
Hakim (2003) points out the importance of female preferences and values, particularly given 
the advances in fertility control. The predictive ability of preferences has been extensively 
documented in a wide variety of contexts, in developed and developing countries across a 
cross-section of geographical locations and fertility levels. Recent examples include evidence 
from the United States (Quensnel-Vallée and Morgan, 2003), Malaysia (Da Vanzo et al., 
2003) as well as from low income, high fertility countries in Africa (such as Hayford and 
Agadjanian, 2012 for Mozambique and Kodzi et al., 2010 for Ghana). In the context of India, 
Roy et al. (2008) find that the preference for ideal family size has a consistent and predictive 
link to subsequent fertility. The present analysis exploits this link by employing fertility 
preferences to study peer effects on fertility. Using preference rather than behaviour enables 
us to focus on changes in preference through social interactions. Employing preference as a 
dependant variable also enables us to avoid analytical issues in capturing imitation effects, 
while maintaining the implications of the analysis for fertility behaviour. 
 
2. Empirical Strategy 
Data 
We employ data from the National Family Health Survey (NFHS) conducted by the 
International Institute for Population Sciences (IIPS) under The Ministry of Health and 
Family Welfare (MOHFW), Government of India. It is a large-scale, multi-round survey 
conducted in a representative sample of households throughout India. We employ all three 
rounds of the survey conducted in 1992-93 (NFHS 1), 1998-99 (NFHS 2), and 2005-06 
(NFHS 3), covering 25, 26 and 29 states in India respectively. The analysis here is performed 
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using the 17 major states.
1
 The survey provides detailed information on fertility for women 
aged 15-49.
2
 Importantly for the present analysis, in addition to the usual fertility indicators 
such as number of children, the survey includes questions pertaining to preferences regarding 
the number of children a woman would like to have. We use this information to define the 
dependent variable in the analysis. 
 
The survey adopts a two-stage sample design in rural areas and a three-stage sample design in 
urban areas. Primary sampling units (PSUs) were selected followed by selection of 
households within the PSUs.
3
 The PSUs normally comprise single villages. In the case of 
very small villages, neighbouring villages are joined together and, in the case of urban areas, 
the PSUs are formed on the basis of census enumeration blocks. This sampling design 
enables us to identify the peer groups. 
 
Identifying peers 
Our aim is to identify peers who facilitate the formation of fertility preference. As discussed 
earlier, individuals consider their personal trade-offs in making fertility choices, but they also 
conform to social norms. Thus, they reference their fertility preferences from the fertility 
choices of their peers. Our first definition of peers is based on the immediate social 
environment of an individual: that is, their neighbourhood. As pointed out by Gaudin (2011), 
and Kravdal (2002), PSUs provide a good measure of neighbours at the community level. 
                                                          
1
 The 17 major states included in our analysis account for roughly 90% of India’s population and make up 
around 87% of India’s GDP. The remaining 11 states, not included in the analysis, were either created very late 
in the period of analysis and data for which is available only for NFHS3 (such as Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and 
Uttrakhand), were too small with lots of missing data points (Goa, Mizoram, Sikkim, Arunanchal Pradesh and 
Maghalya for example), or had unreliable data points (Jammu, Kashmir and Nagaland, for example). 
2
 While it would be interesting to analyse men’s preferences as well, the data provides detailed information 
related to women only. Hence, we restrict the analysis to women.  
3
 Details of the sampling strategy is available at http://dhsprogram.com/Publications/Publication-
Search.cfm?ctry_id=57&c=India&Country=India&cn=India . 
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The mean number of households in a PSU is between 17 and 19, and the majority of PSUs 
consist of up to 30 households (Table 1). Further, the sample of each PSU is statistically 
representative of the area. Thus, PSUs are a good approximation for the neighbourhood or the 
immediate community within which daily interactions take place. Hence, we define 
neighbourhood peers as the group of women residing in the same PSU as the individual.  
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
Apart from proximity and contact within a geographical area, religious grouping is another 
potential transmission channel for fertility norms. Munshi and Myaux (2006) provide robust 
evidence on the role of religion in fertility transition in the context of Bangladesh. 
Traditionally, fertility norms were sustained through adherence to practices prescribed by 
religious authority. While social and economic changes might have weakened the sole 
authority of religion, it still plays a central role in many women’s fertility preferences and 
practices. In the context of a country such as India, traditions and culture play a central role in 
the transmission of cultural preferences or traits. Individuals identify with their peers along 
family lines and on the basis of shared cultural traits, which map back to religious groups 
(Krishnan, 2002). We define religious peers to trace this importance of religious groups. 
Religious peers refers to a group of women of same religious affiliation (Hindu, Muslim, 
Christian, Sikh or Others), living in the same region (capital (or large) city, small city, town 
or countryside) of a particular state. We take the fertility rate (number of living children/total 
number of women) of this group as the religious peers’ fertility rate. For example, for a 
Hindu woman living in Mumbai, Maharashtra, her religious peers would be all the Hindu 
women living in Mumbai. Table A1 in the appendix (Appendix A1) reports the number of 
women in each religious group and the average fertility rate prevailing in each religious 
group for the three NFHS rounds.  By allowing for the influence of observed average fertility 
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of their own religious group, we can explore the extent to which religion’s role in the 
transmission of fertility norms has been substituted or complemented by other influences. 
 
Defining fertility 
The analysis is based on fertility preferences expressed by women. The survey reports the 
ideal number of children that the respondent would like to have in her whole life, irrespective 
of the number she already has. To be more precise, women with no children were asked: ‘If 
you could choose exactly the number of children to have in your whole life, how many would 
that be?’ Women who already had children were asked: ‘If you could go back to the time you 
did not have any children and could choose exactly the number of children to have in your 
whole life, how many would that be?’ We employ this variable as a dependent variable to 
represent fertility preference.  
 
The employed measure of fertility preference is based on “expressed preferences”. This 
approach provides an alternative to the commonly employed “revealed preferences” 
(observed number of children or use of contraception). The effect on fertility outcomes 
(number of children, probability of having a child, probability of having another child) 
analysed in the literature is hypothesised to be the result of a change in fertility preferences 
due to peer effects. Even though peer effects affect preferences, fertility preferences do not 
have a one-to-one correspondence to the actual number of children due to the physical and 
environmental conditions which govern fertility. Manski (2000) provides a conceptual 
framework for modelling social interactions. Agents make decisions consistent with their 
preferences, formed expectations and constraints. The group (to which the agent belongs) can 
affect the agent’s decision through these three possible channels: constraints, expectations 
and preferences.  In the present paper, we explore the preference interactions whereby the 
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actions chosen by the group affect an agent’s preference orderings over the alternatives in her 
choice set.  
 
The empirical strategy is based on the proposition that women aim to conform to the 
observed social norm. Hence, we use the average number of children for the peer group as a 
measure of peer fertility, which is the main independent variable in the following estimations.  
We use the actual number of children instead of the preferred number of children, as women 
can only observe the former and use it to make inferences about the fertility preference of 
their reference group. Women cannot observe the preferred fertility of their peers. Using the 
individual fertility preference as the left hand side variable and the observed average fertility 
for peers as the right hand side variable further enables us to address the well-documented 
conceptual and empirical problems in estimating “imitation effects”.  For example, Kravdal 
(2003) shows that estimations using the average of the dependent variable as a regressor can 
be severely biased. Using two different measures of fertility as dependent and independent 
variables in estimations enables us to address these issues.  
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
Descriptive statistics reported in Table 2 provide background information for our sample. The 
descriptive statistics are reported for the pooled data from the three NFHS rounds (in keeping 
with our estimation sample). The average fertility rate is 3.6 for neighbourhood peers and 2.9 
for religious peers. The standard deviation for neighbourhood peers indicates a wide variation 
in fertility that a woman observes in her neighbourhood. In our sample, education levels are 
very low, most women and men do not complete high school, and men are better educated 
compared to women. Almost all of the women report that husbands work (97.7 percent) while 
only 35.2 percent of women work, and 36.2 percent of the women belong to poor households 
in terms of household wealth. In keeping with India’s broader social and demographic 
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distribution, the vast majority of the women reside in villages (67.3 percent) and Hinduism is 
the dominant religion (81.6 percent).  
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
Table 3 documents the mean values of number of children for neighbourhood peers and 
religious peers by state and survey round. Consistent with the mean values reported in Table 
2, the fertility rate for neighbourhood peers is greater than the fertility rate of religious peers. 
Comparing across the NSHS survey rounds, fertility in India is declining, with the average 
number of children falling for both groups and all states over time. There is regional variation 
across the states, however, with the highest number of children in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh 
and lowest in Kerala. These descriptive statistics point to the presence of time and location 
(state) effects in observed fertility. 
 
Methodology 
The dependent variable of interest is the fertility preference of an individual expressed as the 
ideal number of children. Since this is fertility preference, there is no natural ranking or 
ordering in the outcome variable. While the number of children (e.g. two children or three 
children) is a cardinal variable, the preference for two children cannot be ranked in 
comparison to the preference for three children. Further, the variables are alternative-
invariant: they do not vary over the alternative outcomes. Given the nature of the data and the 
underlying model, we employ a multinominal logit model (MNL) for our estimations.  
 
Let    {       } denote the stated fertility preference outcome     for individual   and X 
denote the explanatory variables. Using MNL, the probability that alternative   is chosen is 
denoted as      [   ]           and given as: 
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     , model identification requires that the parameter   corresponding to the 
base category is set to 0. We use     as the base category. In addition to the observed 
average fertility of neighbourhood peers and religious peers, we include controls for age and 
education for the woman and her partner and relevant household head characteristics. We 
also control for state, time and religion fixed effects in order to isolate the peer effects from 
broader trends. For an unordered multinomial model, there is no single conditional mean of 
the dependent variable    rather, there are   alternatives. Therefore, it is more useful to 
compute marginal effects (MEs) for these models, which measure the change in probabilities 
of  alternatives as regressors change. For multinomial logit models, MEs are computed as: 
                             (2) 
where .  
The multinomial logit model specified in equation (1) is estimated using maximum likelihood. 
While the estimations yield coefficients , the signs of regression coefficients do not give the 
signs of the MEs. For a variable  , the ME is positive if      ̅ . The MEs vary with the 
point of evaluation,   . The MEs reported in tables 4 and 6 are ‘marginal effects at the mean’ 
where we obtain the ME on         of a change in an associated regressor when all the 
other regressors are kept at their sample mean, while MEs reported in tables 6 and 7 are 
‘marginal effects at representative values’. It has to be noted that MEs are computed 
differently for continuous and discrete variables. For discrete variables, ‘marginal effects at 
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the mean’ measures how         changes when the discrete variable changes from 0 to 1, 
keeping all other variables at their sample mean. For continuous variables, ‘marginal effects 
at the mean’ measures how          changes when the continuous variable increases by 1 
unit, keeping all other variables at their sample mean. We calculate and report the average 
marginal effects that are obtained by calculating a marginal effect for each case and 
averaging all the computed effects. In addition to this, we also estimate the models using 
multi-level analysis and standard regression methods (logit model with binary dependent 
variable and OLS with linear dependent variable) as a robustness check. These methods and 
the results are reported in appendix A2.  
 
3. Results 
Peer effects 
We report the calculated marginal effects (equation 2) in Table 4.  
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
The estimates for both the peer groups point to a consistent and robust peer effect. An 
increase in the observed fertility of the peer group reduces the preference for one or two 
children and increases the preference for three or more children. A unit increase in the 
fertility of peers reduces the probability of wanting one child by 1 percent for neighbourhood 
peers and 1.7 percent for religious peers. The probability of wanting two children displays the 
biggest impact in terms of magnitude: it falls by 6.6 percent for neighbourhood peers and 7 
percent for religious peers. In the case of both peer groups, an increase in peer fertility 
increases the probability of preferring three or more children. The shift from a preference for 
two children to a preference for three children is noticeable for religious peers. Preferences 
for more than three children increase with an increase in the observed peer fertility; however, 
these increases are small and decrease with the number of children.  Note that neighbourhood 
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peers represents women in the immediate neighbourhood and religious peers represents 
women belonging to the same religion in similar regions. Thus, religious groups have a larger 
impact on fertility choices of one, two and three children (for a smaller family size), while 
neighbours have a greater impact on fertility choices for bigger families (with four or more 
children).   
 
Effects of other variables 
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
The average marginal effects for the full model of neighbourhood peers are presented in 
Table 5.
4
 Significant average marginal effects for education underscore its important role. 
Education increases the preference for one or two children and decreases the probability of 
wanting any more than two children. This relationship holds for a woman’s own education as 
well as the education level of her husband and of the household head. The effect of a 
woman’s own education is particularly strong: each year of education increases the 
preference for two children by 1.64 percent. We explore the role of education and its 
interaction with peer effects in detail in the next section. 
 
The preference for more than two children increases with an increase in marital duration. 
Bigger households are associated with a preference for larger family size as well, with an 
increase in household size leading to increased preference for 3 or more children. The effect 
of the working status of a woman and her husband is consistent, with labour force 
participation increasing the probability of preferring one or two children. This is also 
supported by the marginal effect of wealth status: an increase in household wealth increases 
the preference for two children by 5.4 precent. Religion also has a significant effect on 
                                                          
4
 A full set of results for religious peers is available from the authors. 
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fertility preferences. Muslim women have a higher probability of preferring three or more 
children.
5
  In addition to the above, we also investigate whether the peer effects vary by age 
(at 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40 and 45 years) and find that the overall magnitude and significance of 
effects are similar across the age distribution.
6
  
 
Role of education 
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE 
We have discussed the significance and importance of peer fertility and education in terms of 
their individual effects on fertility preference. Here we document the role of education in 
moderating the peer effects on fertility. Table 6 reports the average marginal effect of 
neighbourhood peers and religious peers by a woman’s education (years). An increase in peer 
fertility reduces the probability of preferring one or two children and increases the probability 
of preferring three or more children. This is the overall peer effect we identified earlier. 
However, the size of the effect changes with the education level, and this variation in peer 
effects points to an interesting role of education in moderating peer influence on fertility 
preferences. 
    
The top panel of Table 6 reports the effect of neighbourhood peers. An increase in peer 
fertility reduces the probability that a woman has a preference for one or fewer children; the 
probability reduces by 0.8 percent for woman with no education, by 1.58 percent for woman 
with 12 years of education, and by 2.29 percent for woman with an equivalent of a bachelor 
degree. On the other hand, the reduction in the preference for two children is largest for 
women with no education (7.29 percent) compared to women with 12 years of education and 
                                                          
5
 Though not reported in Table 5, we have found region to have a significant effect on fertility preference. 
Compared to villages, women in cities and towns have a higher probability of preferring one or two children and 
a lower probability of preferring more than three children. 
6
 Results available from authors. 
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tertiary educated women (probabilities for these fall by 6.18 percent and 3.44 percent, 
respectively). An increase in peer fertility increases the fertility preferences for three or more 
children. Peer effect has the greatest effect on the preference of educated women for three 
children; for example, this increases by 1.01 percent for women with no education and by 3.5 
percent for tertiary educated women. However, even if the peer effect has a positive influence 
on the desire for larger family size (four, five, six or more children), educated women show 
only small increases. For example, the preference for five or six children increases by only 
0.24 percent for tertiary educated women, compared to an increase of 1.3 percent (approx.) 
for women with no education.  
 
The effect of religious peers (reported in the bottom panel of Table 6) further supports the 
findings of education moderating the influence of peer fertility. Similarly to the above 
discussion, education amplifies the magnitude of the peer effect in decreasing the preference 
for one child (or fewer) and increasing the preference for three children. On the other hand, 
education reduces the magnitude of peer effect on preferences for more than three children.  
Looking at the effect of the two peer groups – neighbourhood peers and religious peers – on 
the fertility choices of a woman, some interesting observations are worth mentioning: 
 As we observed earlier, fertility norms prevailing in common religion groupings, in 
general, have a greater influence on fertility choices for smaller family size (one or 
three children); and fertility norms prevailing in the immediate neighbourhood 
influences more the fertility choices for a larger family (four or more children). This 
result holds irrespective of the education level of a woman. 
 The role of education in the preference for two children is particularly noticeable. 
Religious peers influence the fertility choice of two children for women with no or 
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low education (less than 12 years of education), while neighbourhood peers have 
more influence on women with 15 and more years of education.   
 Though the preference for bigger families (more than four children) is greatly 
influenced by the observed fertility in the immediate neighbourhood, this 
neighbourhood peer effect decreases considerably as the number of education years 
increases. For a woman with 18 to 21 years of education, this effect is estimated to be 
in the range of 0.2-0.3 percent; for a woman with 0 to 3 years of education, this effect 
is in the range of 1.2-1.3 percent.  
 
Peer effects by Wealth Status 
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE 
We also explore how wealth status influences peer effects. The peer effects reported in Table 
7 show two notable features. First, the fertility norms prevailing in the immediate 
neighbourhood have a differential impact on women belonging to wealthier households and 
on women belonging to poorer households. On the other hand, the impact of religious peers 
does not vary much by the wealth status. This difference is particularly noteworthy for the 
preference for three children: that is, an increase in neighbourhood peer fertility leads to a 1.7 
percent increase in the preferences of women from richer households, while the preferences 
of women from poor households increase by only 0.7 percent. Looking at the effect of 
religious peers on fertility choices, we notice that an increase in religious peers’ fertility 
increases the preference for three children by 5.6 percent for richer households and 4.8 
percent for poorer households. Second, in line with the findings for education and 
irrespective of wealth status, fertility norms prevailing in common religion groupings 
influence preferences for smaller family size (one to three children) while fertility norms 
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prevailing in immediate neighbourhood  influence fertility preferences for a larger family 
(four or more children). 
 
4. Discussion 
The results show the importance of peers, both geographical and religious, in determining the 
fertility preferences of women. Our results are robust to alternative estimation strategies as 
reported in appendix A2. We find empirical evidence supporting the role of conformist social 
norms in women’s fertility preferences. Women do respond to the family size norm in their 
social environment (Bhattacharya and Chakraborty, 2012). The biggest impact of increased 
fertility of a peer group is in reducing the preference for two children and shifting it towards 
the preference for three or four children. This effect is particularly notable for women from 
better wealth status households. While an increase in peer fertility does increase the 
preference for more children, women exhibit a strong preference for no more than four 
children. Despite an increase in peer fertility, the preference for five or six children generally 
increases by less than 1 percent.  
 
The influence of the two peer groups is not symmetric and reveals the relative importance of 
neighbours and religious groups. The fertility norms of the religious group have a greater 
effect on the desire for smaller family size, reducing the preference for two children by 
almost 7 percent. On the other hand, an increase in the preference for a larger family (more 
than three children) is influenced more by the immediate social environment, the observed 
fertility in the neighbourhood. Policy makers in countries characterized by high fertility and 
low incomes aim to reduce the fertility rate; on the other hand, many advanced economies 
attempt to increase the fertility rate. Our results suggest that policy interventions targeting 
neighbourhoods or local communities can have a greater impact through the preference for 
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four or more children, while the bigger impact of policies targeting religious groups can be 
through the preference for one, two or three children.  
 
Stable social groups with conformist behaviour can lead to sub-optimal equilibrium traps, 
because an individual’s incentive to choose an action to conform to her social group can 
overwhelm her incentive to choose for intrinsic reasons (Akerlof, 1997). In this context, our 
findings regarding education can provide a useful policy direction. Education plays an 
important role by reducing the preference for more than two children and further moderating 
the influence of peer fertility. Even though an increase in the observed fertility of peers has a 
positive influence on women’s preference for more children, better-educated women tend to 
gravitate towards preferring two to three children. Educated women are less influenced by 
peer fertility in their preference for more than three children. This moderating influence of 
education could be due to the well-documented effects of education such as increased 
opportunity cost of childbearing (see Kravdal (2002) for a review of effects of education on 
fertility), and/or by providing an alternative peer group for the woman to reference her 
fertility choices. This finding provides additional support for investment in education as a 
means to lower fertility rates. The moderating role of education would be of particular 
interest to policymakers seeking to lower the fertility rate in developing countries with high 
fertility, where larger family size is a social norm within community and religious groups.  
 
There is scope to extend the analysis to gain further insights into these effects. The 
identification of peer effects raises questions about isolating the causal effects, as seminally 
explored by Manski (1993). There can be a propensity for a person’s behaviour to vary 
positively with the group behaviour through many channels, including through the behaviour 
of the group (endogenous interactions), based on the exogenous characteristics of the group, 
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or through shared context or characteristics (correlated effects). While these effects cannot be 
separately identified with the employed data, availability of longitudinal data would shed 
further light on the causal relationships and channels of peer effects.  
 
5. Conclusion 
We investigate the impact of changes in average fertility of peer groups on the fertility 
preferences of women. In the context of India, we identify two peer groups – neighbourhood 
and religious peers. These two peer groups identify the transmission of fertility norms 
through observed behaviour in the surroundings and through religious traditions and practices. 
We find that both peer groups have a significant influence on women’s fertility preferences. 
Peers have the most profound impact on the fertility preference for two to three children. 
With the increase in fertility rates of her peers, a woman is more likely to have a preference 
for three children (over two children). We find that women are more likely to be influenced 
by the fertility norms of their religion cohort in their choice of one to three children, while the 
fertility norms prevailing in their immediate neighbourhood have a greater influence on the 
preference for a bigger family size (four or more children).  
 
We also examine the role of education and wealth as transmission channels between the 
fertility norms of peers and fertility preferences of women. We find that neighbourhood peers 
(unlike religion based peers) have a differential impact on the fertility choices of women of 
different wealth statuses. Neighbourhood peers affect the fertility choices of women from 
wealthier households more, compared to the fertility choices of women from poor households. 
Out of the two aforementioned channels of transmission, education is found to be the most 
important in moderating peer influences. Educated women (with 12 or more years of 
education) are more influenced by their peers in their fertility choice of smaller families (one 
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to three children) and less in the fertility choice of bigger families (four or more children), 
while the opposite holds for women with no or less than 12 years education. It has to be noted 
that the difference in peer effects between low educated women and better educated women 
are most pronounced for the fertility choice of three children. An increase in peer fertility 
greatly increases the preference for three children for educated women but does not have 
much effect on the preference of no or low educated women.
7
 
 
Understanding women’s fertility preferences and identifying the main channels of influence 
for these preferences is vital for informing family planning and gender policies. In the context 
of India, this paper shows that women reference their fertility preferences from their 
neighbours and religious groups. Hence, attempts to change fertility norms should target the 
peer group, not just the individual. The analysis also shows that education is an effective 
means of channelling these fertility norms. 
  
                                                          
7
 Educated women are defined to be those who have 12 or more years of education while low educated women 
are those ones who have 0 to three years of education. 
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Table 1: Peer groups: Descriptive Statistics 
Notes:  
 PSU refers to Primary Sampling Units of NFHS survey. A  PSU constitutes a peer group defined as 
neighbourhood peers. 
 Religious peers is defined as a group of women of a particular religion (Hindu, Muslim, Christian, 
Sikh or others) in a region (capital (or large) city, small city, town or countryside) within a state. 
  
 NFHS1 NFHS2 NFHS3 
 Neighbourhood  peers 
No of 
Households in a 
PSU 
No of 
PSUs 
Percent 
(%) 
No of 
PSUs 
Percent 
 (%) 
No of 
PSUs 
Percent 
 (%) 
Less than 10 338 11.81 118 4.37 136 5.09 
10 to 20 1,511 52.81 1,315 48.74 1,410 52.73 
20 to 30 809 28.28 1,067 39.55 941 35.19 
30 to 40 159 5.56 165 6.12 153 5.72 
40 to 50 36 1.26 27 1 34 1.27 
More than 50 8 0.28 6 0.22 - - 
       
Total no of PSUs 2861  2698  2674  
Average number 
of  Households 
in a  PSU 
18  19 
 
18 
 
 Religious  peers 
 No of 
women 
 No of 
women 
 No of 
women 
 
Average number 
of women in a 
peer group 
219  225  230  
(Standard 
deviation) (584.38)  (608.17)  (486.89)  
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Fertility rate: 
Neighbourhood peers  
3.629 0.791 1 8 
Fertility rate: Religious  
peers 2.877 0.412 1 8 
Women Education (Years) 3.107 4.376 0 23 
Husband Education (Years) 5.826 5.039 0 30 
Household Head Education 
(years) 5.023 4.909 0 24 
Women Age(Years) 34.182 7.893 15 49 
Husband Age(Years) 40.127 9.011 15 70 
Household Head Age 
(Years) 45.228 12.181 15 90 
Household Size 7.021 3.441 1 39 
Marital Duration(grouped, 
in years) 
0-4 : 5.24% , 5-9: 14.96% ,10-14: 19.65%, 15-19: 19.76%, 
20-24: 18%, 25-29: 14.23%, 30+: 8.16% 
Sex of Household Head Male: 94.16%, Female: 5.84% 
Women Working Working: 35.22%, Not Working: 64.78% 
Husband working Working: 97.67%, Not Working: 2.33% 
Wealth Status Poor to Poorest: 36.21%, Medium, Rich to Richest: 63.79% 
States 
 (sample distribution) 
(% of  All India Sample) 
Andhra Pradesh:  5.13%  
Assam: 4.02%  
Bihar: 7.95%  
Gujarat: 4.74 
Karnataka: 5.50%  
Kerala: 3.18%  
Madhya Pradesh: 8.95%  
Maharashtra: 6.73%  
Orissa: 5.25%  
Punjab:  3.77%  
Haryana: 3.72%  
Himachal Pradesh: 3.54 
Delhi: 3.65%  
Rajasthan: 7.77%  
Tamil Nadu: 5.05%  
Uttar Pradesh: 15.56%  
West Bengal: 5.49% 
Regions  
(Sample Distribution) 
Capital (or large) Cities: 13.71%,  
Small Cities: 7.73%,  
Towns: 11.18%,  
Countryside(Villages): 67.38% 
Religion  
(Sample Distribution) 
Hindu:81.66%  
Muslim:12.75%  
Christian:1.70% 
 Sikh:2.70% 
Others:1.18% 
Notes: 
 Descriptive statistics reported for the three NFHS samples (NFHS1:1992-93, NFHS2: 1998-99 and 
NFHS3: 2005-06) pooled together.  
 Fertility rate calculated as an average fertility rate (number of living children/number of women). 
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Table 3: Fertility rate by peer groups 
 NFHS1 NFHS2 NFHS3 
State Neighbourhood 
peers 
Religious  
peers 
Neighbourhood 
peers 
Religious  
peers 
Neighbourhood 
peers 
Religious  
peers 
Andhra 
Pradesh 3.441 2.722 3.099 2.485 3.081 2.527 
Assam 4.203 3.207 3.824 2.941 3.318 2.578 
Bihar 4.037 3.134 4.114 3.225 4.329 3.353 
Gujarat 3.628 2.883 3.421 2.772 3.243 2.624 
Karnataka 3.664 2.850 3.512 2.749 3.073 2.489 
Kerala 3.118 2.461 2.720 2.287 2.525 2.145 
Madhya 
Pradesh 3.835 2.986 3.884 3.096 3.615 2.913 
Maharashtra 3.620 2.909 3.284 2.698 3.065 2.511 
Orissa 3.499 2.763 3.369 2.705 3.158 2.533 
Punjab 3.619 2.968 3.253 2.708 3.059 2.509 
Haryana 3.765 2.993 3.613 2.915 3.327 2.730 
Himachal 
Pradesh 3.452 2.843 3.251 2.696 2.955 2.471 
Delhi 3.582 2.805 3.423 2.731 3.345 2.671 
Rajasthan 3.950 3.096 4.040 3.183 4.016 3.177 
Tamil Nadu 3.367 2.646 2.912 2.351 2.647 2.238 
Uttar 
Pradesh 4.121 3.180 4.148 3.260 4.257 3.352 
West 
Bengal 3.810 2.861 3.345 2.569 3.179 2.460 
All India 3.761 2.946 3.646 2.901 3.456 2.770 
 
Notes: 
 Fertility rate is calculated as an average fertility rate (number of living children/number of 
women). 
 Neighbourhood peers consist of women living within a PSU (Primary Sampling Unit) of NFHS 
survey. 
 Religious peers is defined as a group of women of a particular religion (Hindu, Muslim, Christian, 
Sikh or others) in a region (capital (or large) city, small city, town or countryside) within a state. 
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Table 4: Average Marginal Effects of Peers on Fertility preference 
Fertility Preference 
(no of children) 
Neighbourhood  
peers 
Religious  
peers 
   
1 or less -0.010*** -0.017*** 
Equal to 2 -0.066*** -0.069*** 
Equal to 3 0.012*** 0.052*** 
Equal to 4 0.038*** 0.030*** 
Equal to 5 0.012*** 0.003** 
6 or more 0.013*** 0.001 
Notes: 
  *** denotes statistical significance at 1%; ** denotes statistical significance at 5%; * denotes 
statistical significance at 10%. 
 The table reports the average marginal effect of fertility of neighbourhood peers (women living in 
the neighbourhood) and religious peers (groups of women of a particular religion in a region 
within a state) on fertility preference. The multinomial logit model specified in equation (1), 
includes controls for education (woman, husband and household head), age (woman, husband and 
household head), marital duration, household size, sex of household head, work status (woman 
and husband), wealth, state, region within the state, survey round and religion.   
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Table 5: Average Marginal Effects other controls variables in the model for 
Neighbourhood peers 
 
 Fertility preference (No of children) 
Variables 1 or less   Equal to 2 Equal to 3 Equal to 4 Equal to 5 6 or more 
Education (years)       
Woman  0.002*** 0.016*** -0.004*** -0.010*** -0.003*** -0.002*** 
Husband  0.000 0.003*** 0.002*** -0.003*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
Household Head  0.001*** 0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000** 0.000 
Age (years)       
Woman  0.001*** -0.000 -0.002*** 0.001*** 0.000 0.000*** 
Husband  0.000*** 0.001*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
Household Head  0.000*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.000* 0.000*** 0.001*** 
Marital Duration -0.009*** -0.032*** 0.016*** 0.014*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 
Household Size -0.001*** -0.008*** 0.001*** 0.005*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Male 
Household Head 
-0.003*** -0.014*** 0.004 0.012*** -0.002* 0.004** 
Work       
Woman  -0.003*** -0.004*** 0.000 0.004*** 0.000 0.002*** 
Husband  0.003** 0.007* -0.009** -0.006 -0.001 0.006*** 
Wealth Status 0.002** 0.054*** 0.005*** -0.034*** -0.013*** -0.014*** 
Religion       
Hindu 0.007*** -0.001* 0.020*** -0.013** -0.003 -0.001 
Muslim -0.002 -0.103*** 0.020*** 0.045*** 0.017*** 0.023*** 
Christian 0.000 -0.060*** 0.042*** -0.004 0.013*** 0.008** 
Sikh 0.014*** 0.032*** 0.006 -0.008 -0.021*** -0.023*** 
 
Notes: 
 *** denotes statistical significance at 1%; ** denotes statistical significance at 5%; * denotes statistical 
significance at 10%. The table reports the average marginal effect on fertility preference.  
 ‘Male Household Head’ has value = 1 if household head is male and value = 0 if female.  ‘Husband 
working’ has value = 1 if currently working and value = 0 if not working.  ‘Women working’ has value = 
1 if currently not working and value = 0 if working. ‘Wealth Status’ has value = 1 if a woman belongs to 
‘medium, richer and richest’ and value = 0 if she belongs to poor to poorest economic status. 
 Estimation include controls for states (17 in total), regions (capital (or large) city, small city, town and 
village) and NFHS rounds (3 in total). The reference state for state level dummies is West Bengal; the 
reference region for region dummies is ‘village’; the reference round for round dummies is ‘NFHS 
round1’; the reference religion for religion dummies is ‘others’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
32 
 
Table 6: Marginal Effects of Peers by Education 
 
Fertility preference Years of education 
(No of children) 0 9 12 18 21 
  
 Neighbourhood  peers 
1 or less -0.008*** -0.014*** -0.016*** -0.020*** -0.023*** 
Equal to 2 -0.073*** -0.068*** -0.062*** -0.045*** -0.034*** 
Equal to 3 0.010*** 0.031*** 0.035*** 0.036*** 0.035*** 
Equal to 4 0.043*** 0.035*** 0.031*** 0.022*** 0.018*** 
Equal to 5 0.013*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 
6 or more 0.014*** 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 
  
 Religious  peers 
1 or less -0.012*** -0.024*** -0.028*** -0.038*** -0.044*** 
Equal to 2 -0.078*** -0.073*** -0.064*** -0.039*** -0.024*** 
Equal to 3 0.052*** 0.065*** 0.065*** 0.059*** 0.053*** 
Equal to 4 0.033*** 0.027*** 0.024*** 0.016*** 0.013*** 
Equal to 5 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
6 or more 0.002 0.002** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 
 
Notes: 
 *** denotes statistical significance at 1%; ** denotes statistical significance at 5%; * denotes 
statistical significance at 10%. 
 The table reports the average marginal effect of fertility of neighbourhood peers (women living in 
the neighbourhood) and religious peers (groups of women of a particular religion in a region 
within a state) on fertility preference. The multinomial logit model specified in equation (1), 
includes controls for education (woman, husband and household head), age (woman, husband and 
household head), marital duration, household size, sex of household head, work status (woman 
and husband), wealth, state, region within the state, survey round and religion.   
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Table 7: Marginal Effects of Peers by Wealth Status 
 
Fertility preference Wealth Status of the Household 
(No of children) Medium to richest Poor to poorest 
 Neighbourhood peers 
 1 or less -0.010*** -0.010*** 
Equal to 2 -0.068*** -0.067*** 
Equal to 3 0.017*** 0.007*** 
Equal to 4 0.039*** 0.040*** 
Equal to 5 0.011*** 0.013*** 
6 or more 0.011*** 0.016*** 
 Religious  peers 
 1 or less -0.017*** -0.017*** 
Equal to 2 -0.072*** -0.069*** 
Equal to 3 0.056*** 0.048*** 
Equal to 4 0.030*** 0.032*** 
Equal to 5 0.003** 0.003*** 
6 or more 0.001 0.002 
   
 
Notes: 
 *** denotes statistical significance at 1%; ** denotes statistical significance at 5%; * denotes 
statistical significance at 10%. 
 The table reports the average marginal effect of fertility of neighbourhood peers (women living in 
the neighbourhood) and religious peers (groups of women of a particular religion in a region 
within a state) on fertility preference. The multinomial logit model specified in equation (1) 
includes controls for education (woman, husband and household head), age (woman, husband and 
household head), marital duration, household size, sex of household head, work status (woman 
and husband),wealth, state, region within the state, survey round and religion.   
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Appendix A1 
Table A1: Number of Women and Average Fertility Rate by Religion  
Religion NFHS 1 NFHS2 NFHS3 
 Number of 
Women 
Avg. 
fertility 
rate  
Number of 
Women 
Avg. 
fertility 
rate 
Number of 
Women 
Avg. 
fertility 
rate 
Hindu 48063(83.0%) 2.9 50627(83.9%) 2.9 45111(80.7%) 2.7 
Muslim 5754(9.9%) 3.4 6197(10.3%) 3.4 7220(12.9%) 3.4 
Christian 1284(2.2%) 2.7 1148(1.9%) 2.5 1224(2.2%) 2.3 
Sikh 2045(3.5%) 2.9 1700(2.8%) 2.6 1533(2.7%) 2.4 
Others 783(1.4%) 2.8 645(1.1%) 2.7 841(1.5%) 2.5 
Total 57929 2.9 60317 2.9 55929 2.7 
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Appendix A2: Robustness check using alternative methodologies  
The sample design of NFHS survey entails multi stage stratified sampling.
8
 Given the 
multilevel nature of survey data, we implement multilevel modelling with two level random 
intercept models. We consider a two level system where a total of n individuals (or women in 
our case at level 1) are nested within J groups (states in our case at level 2).
9
 We use a ‘two 
level random intercept model’ where state level random effects are modelled as random 
intercepts for each state.  
 
For a binary response variable    (fertility preference),  (   |       )         (     ) 
and a generalised linear random intercept model for the response probability     can be 
written as: 
  (              )              
The model is estimated for two specifications of the dependent variable. In specification 1 
fertility preference 1 takes value 0 for ideal family size of two or less than two children and 1 
for preference for 3 or more children, while in specification 2, fertility preference 2 is equal 
to 0 if ideal family size is 3 or less children and is equal to 1 otherwise. Here,     
         , with each state   consisting of           observations. The vector     are the 
covariates for fixed effects (which in our case includes fertility rates of neighbourhood peers 
(or religious peers) including other control variables) with regression coefficient (fixed 
                                                          
8
 The sample design for each state is a systematic, stratified sample of households with two stages in Rural 
Areas (selection of villages followed by selection of households) and three stages in urban areas (selection of 
cities/towns, followed by urban blocks and then households). More details are available at 
http://www.measuredhs.com/pubs/pdf/FRIND1/FRIND1.pdf for NFHS1; 
http://www.measuredhs.com/pubs/pdf/FRIND2/FRIND2.pdf for NFHS2; and 
http://www.measuredhs.com/pubs/pdf/FRIND3/FRIND3-Vol1AndVol2.pdf for NFHS3 
9 We decided to apply a two level structure as our sample is representative only at the state level. 
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effects) .    are the state level random effects (or residuals) which are represented, here, as 
state level random intercepts.     is the overall intercept in the model and the intercept for the 
given state   is       which can be higher or lower than the overall intercept depending on 
whether    is greater than or less than 0. The variance for intercepts across states is 
    (  )     
   and is specified as the between state variance adjusted for    . We estimate 
the ordinary logit model with state level fixed effects as well as the two level random 
intercept logit model with state level random effects.  We also estimate a standard regression 
model, treating the dependent variable as continuous.  The results from these models serve as 
important robustness checks since, given the multi-level aspect of the present analysis, 
standard regression could be biased. As reported in table A2, the effect of neighbourhood 
peers and religious peers on a woman’s preferred number of children remains statistically 
significant and positive under alternative specifications.  
 
Table A2: Effect of Peers on Fertility Preference from Alternative Model Specifications 
Specification  Neighbourhood peers Religious peers 
Fertility Preference as continuous variable   
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 0.182*** 0.018** 
Fertility Preference 1 (binary variable)   
Ordinary Logit with State level fixed effects 0.437*** 
(1.54***) 
0.434** 
(1.54**) 
Two level Logit with State level random effects 0.508*** 
(1.66***) 
1.06** 
(2.90**) 
Fertility Preference 2 (binary variable)   
Ordinary Logit with State level fixed effects 0.456*** 
(1.57***) 
0.315** 
(1.37**) 
Two level Logit with State level random effects 0.495*** 
(1.64***) 
1.15** 
(3.17**) 
Notes: 
 The table reports the coefficient of fertility rate ((number of living children/number of women) of 
neighbourhood peers and religious peers on the fertility preference of a woman.  
 *** denotes statistical significance at 1%; ** denotes statistical significance at 5%; * denotes statistical 
significance at 10%. Figures in parentheses in rows 4 and 5 are Odds Ratio for logit models. 
 Fertility preference1: value = 0 for preference less than or equal to two children and value = 1 otherwise; 
Fertility preference 2: value = 0 for preference less than or equal to three children and value = 1 otherwise. 
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 Estimations include education and age (in years for woman, husband and household head), marital duration, 
household size, and dummy variables for women and husband work status, woman’s wealth status and 
other fixed effects like region, religion, state and time (NFHS round) as control variables.  
